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Abstract 
This article discusses the regulation of financial benchmarks and suggests an appropriate regulatory 
design that harnesses the benefits of market-based governance and yet meets the objectives of 
regulatory governance. The article argues that the existing regulatory regime in the UK, the 
proposed regulatory framework in the EU and the IOSCO-OICU recommendations are based on 
achieving some balance between market-based and regulatory governance for benchmarks, but 
certain aspects of these regimes could compromise regulatory goals while not optimally harnessing 
market-based governance. The article advocates the adoption of a user-centric analysis to first 
determine the nature of financial benchmarks and argues that the scope and design of regulation for 
financial benchmarks should be based on that fundamental analysis. The regulatory framework 
should then address the healthy balance between market-based and regulatory governance for the 
benchmarks determined to be appropriately subject to regulation.  
Introduction 
Financial benchmarks used to fall within an area of self-regulation up until the uncovering of the 
manipulation scandals related to interest-rate benchmarks such as the London Interbank Offered 
Rate and price benchmarks such as the London foreign exchange ‘4 pm fix’. Self-regulation has not 
been inappropriate for financial benchmarks as they are by nature privately-produced goods for 
market transactions. However, a number of widely used financial benchmarks were subject to the 
influence of a few market players, while being adopted by millions of stakeholders worldwide. 
Benchmark manipulation could and did take place, such as in relation to the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR). Although it is difficult to prove causation of loss to individual contracting 
parties due to such manipulation, the integrity of the benchmark and market confidence were 
damaged.  The revelations that banks such as Barclays,1 UBS2 and JP Morgan3 have been engaged in 
manipulative relating to LIBOR, the WMR London fix for foreign exchange trading and the London 
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gold fix have raised concerns globally as to the need to protect the market from toxic financial sector 
culture4 that has existed way before the global financial crisis of 2008-9. 
The UK Financial Conduct Authority has stepped in to regulate the LIBOR benchmark5 and will 
include in its regulatory regime seven other benchmarks from 1 April 2015.6 A review7 is also 
underway to consider an appropriate governance framework for maintaining fair and effective 
markets in the UK, including the role of financial benchmarks. The Fair and Effective Markets Review 
was established by the UK Chancellor in June 2014, to conduct a comprehensive and forward-looking 
assessment of the way wholesale financial markets operate. The aim is to produce a comprehensive 
survey and recommendations that would holistically address issues of trust and confidence in 
wholesale markets, to help restore trust in those markets and influence the international debate on 
trading practices.8 The Review states that their concern is with financial benchmarks that are UK-
based, of significant importance to the financial markets and relating to which serious misconduct 
concerns have arisen.9 
Legislation in the European Union is being developed for financial benchmarks in general,10 and 
international standards under the OICU-IOSCO11 have been introduced. The governance schemes 
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proposed/implemented (where LIBOR is concerned)12 at the UK, EU and international levels are 
broadly similar, and converge along the themes of maintaining the existing profile of benchmarks 
while introducing governance frameworks in order to restore market confidence in the existing 
benchmarks. The current frameworks attempt to balance regulatory governance13  with aspects of 
market-based governance. These frameworks do not treat the regulated financial benchmark as a 
public good per se and this article argues that this is the right approach. However, this article will 
argue that certain aspects of the current regulatory frameworks fail to adopt an optimal balance 
between regulatory and market-based governance and hence over-regulate certain areas and under-
regulate other crucial respects.  
This article first considers why and which aspects of financial benchmarks ought to be subject to 
regulatory governance. Section A adopts a user-centric analysis and aspects of behavioural 
economics to analyse the nature of financial benchmarks in order to derive an appropriate scope for 
regulatory governance. Section B discusses the limitations of market-based governance to meet 
secondary users’ needs and discusses the optimal extent of regulatory governance and the design of 
such governance frameworks. Mapping this analysis onto a critical study of the current regulatory 
frameworks, Section C suggests that there are the current regulatory frameworks could be adjusted 
to more appropriately navigate the interface between market-based and public interest concerns, 
and explores an alternative approach. Section D concludes. 
A. A User-Centric Analysis for Financial Benchmarks and Defining the Scope of ‘Regulable 
Benchmarks’ 
A financial benchmark can be in the form of an interest rate benchmark which serves the purpose of 
sign-posting the cost of credit at any one time. An interest rate benchmark like the London Inter-
bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) provides a basis for the calculation of the price of debt over a period of 
time. As debt contracts need to mature, whether in the short term or longer term, parties to such a 
contract who have to agree on the price of debt at the outset are unable to fix the price where the 
value of a currency inherently fluctuates according to changes in interest rate.  Benchmarking the 
price of a debt contract allows for limited flexibility and the best-possible certainty in determining 
price in an incomplete contracting situation. The benchmark device thus saves on future transaction 
costs in terms of research and negotiation costs over the period of the contract. It acts as a 
facilitator for trust and access to such transactions, and serves the wider economic objective of 
democratising access to credit.14 The LIBOR was first developed in the 1980s15 to facilitate the 
syndicated loans market, which allowed groups of banks together to fund large corporate 
borrowings and to share risks. In order to arrive at a price of debt that would be agreeable to all in 
the most cost-effective manner, the use of an interest rate benchmark to price the loan over the 
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term seemed most efficacious and sensible. LIBOR has been generated by banks in the syndicated 
loans market, but the adoption of LIBOR to price debt contracts has extended way beyond the 
primary users that are financial institutions. 
 Other financial benchmarks that serve the purpose of price discovery and the reduction of 
transaction costs are found in contracts that involve currency exchanges, e.g. the WM Reuters 4pm 
fix for foreign exchange; and commodities whose prices are subject to regular fluctuations in market 
discovery, e.g. the London gold fix and LBMA silver fix, and the ICE Brent futures for crude oil.16 
These are largely used in the wholesale sector. 
Another type of financial benchmark would be indices that aggregate the financial performance of 
financial assets in a trading market, such as stock market indices. A stock market index such as the 
FTSE100 is a share index of the 100 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange with the highest 
market capitalisation. Hence, the FTSE100 can be used as a benchmark to evaluate the performance 
of large cap securities. Stock market indices17 are generally useful as benchmarks for evaluating 
investment performance. Asset owners such as pension and collective investment funds would often 
contractually stipulate that asset managers’ performance be evaluated according to a choice of stock 
market indices.18 Individual private wealth management can also be structured along those lines.  
Another type of financial benchmark would be indices that indicate certain macro-economic findings 
that take stock of the current state of an economy or indicate certain trends ahead. These may be 
used in incomplete contracts for longer term price determination, or used in informing public policy 
decision-making and strategic decision-making in the private sector. For example, the consumer 
price index (CPI) measures changes in the price level of a market basket of consumer goods and 
services purchased by households. Changes in the CPI may indicate changes in inflation, and can 
affect wages and pensions obligations. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is also an index that falls 
within this typology, measuring the level of output in a domestic economy in order to determine 
economic performance. GDP information feeds into public policy making and strategic private sector 
decisions such as investment and development. 
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Rauterberg and Verstein19 describe the different types of financial benchmarks as falling within three 
typologies- the product index, the by-product index and the public index. The typologies are 
constructed from the producers’ perspectives. The product index is constructed by the relevant 
exchange or institution that sells the index through licensing use, as it is a market good developed to 
meet information and evaluation needs. The stock market and securities indices fall within this 
category. The by-product index is a benchmark that is developed in order to facilitate other 
transactions, and so it is not an end-product in itself. The interest rate and market instrument 
indices fall within this typology. The public indices are developed as information goods that serve a 
wide range of purposes and can be treated akin to public goods. The authors take the view that the 
producers’ perspective is the important one for classifying these indices. The producers’ perspective 
highlights the nature of incentives that accompany production and an examination of those 
incentives can reveal the weaknesses in the reliability of these benchmarks, if any. Product indices 
are produced for sale with a view to profit, and hence the producer has every incentive to make the 
index robust to maintain market trust and adoption. Public indices are produced for public interest 
purposes generally by government or not-for-profit groups and hence the integrity of the indices is 
maintained by producers’ commitments. By-product indices are however only facilitative in nature 
and producers are less committed to their quality as long as transactions are not affected. Further 
the lack of producer commitment to maintain the quality of the indices could be ascribed to a 
tragedy of the commons situation. The authors hence recommend that the weaknesses in LIBOR 
flow from its nature as a by-product index, and the quality of such an index can only be improved if 
by-producers are allowed to become producers, having stronger intellectual property and 
proprietary rights over these indices so that they can profit out of index production. In this way, the 
quality of by-product indices can be improved.20 
The main critique against Rauterberg and Verstein’s suggestion is that access to the use of by-
product indices would become restricted21 which is an undesirable consequence.  Undiscriminating 
access is itself very valuable to the wider objectives of democratising access to financial transactions, 
and the ‘proprietisation’ of a by-product index which is intended to facilitate  transactions in the 
market seems counter-intuitive to its facilitative properties. This article suggests that the producer-
centric perspective adopted by Rauterberg and Verstein may be incomplete, and proposes to take 
the opposite perspective from the producers’ point of view with regard to the nature of a financial 
benchmark. It argues that the appropriate governance mechanism for financial benchmarks should 
be designed according to the types of users the benchmark attracts. The user perspective helps in 
shaping the scope of governance, and behavioural observations in relation to users can be used to 
inform of appropriate designs in governance frameworks. 
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The article suggests that financial benchmarks may be classified into ‘primary use’ benchmarks and 
‘primary plus secondary use’ benchmarks. ‘Primary use’ benchmarks can only be used upon payment 
for a licence and cannot be freely redistributed. The stock market and securities indices such as the 
FTSE and Standard and Poor indices fall into this category. Each index has different proprietary 
characteristics that suit different investment portfolio assessment needs. Hence, they are not 
capable of easy redistribution.  Producers and users are in a symbiotic relationship as users’ needs in 
investment performance evaluation feed into index design and production. The high level of 
bilateralism enjoyed between producers and users in the market for such ‘primary use’ benchmarks 
ensures high levels of commitment to production quality for users. Further, primary users’ adoption 
of certain indices is used as a distinguishing characteristic in the competition for mandates among 
asset managers. As ‘primary-use’ benchmarks are characterised by a high level of bilateralism 
between benchmark producers and users,  such a market is capable of being self-governing to meet 
its’ constituents’ needs. 
However, ‘primary plus secondary use’ benchmarks are those benchmarks that may/may not be 
produced with wide dissemination in mind, but are nevertheless capable of free redistribution and 
wide dissemination. This may be because the benchmark is readily observable and easy to 
redistribute, and producers have no incentive to restrict use. Where LIBOR is concerned, although 
the development of the benchmark was for the purpose of providing the necessary mechanism for 
banks in a syndicated loan group to enter into such transactions in a cost-effective manner, the 
primary users have no incentive to restrict use and indeed every incentive to promote use as the 
benchmark device could then be used to overcome transaction costs in other syndicated loan 
transactions, credit and structured credit transactions, derivative transactions and so on. The 
benchmark device was crucial for the development of transaction and risk management 
technologies generally. In as much as benchmark development promoted access to financial 
transactions, and hence a form of democratisation of finance, it also promoted growth and 
expansion in financial intermediation and served financial institutions’ private benefits. Even if a 
completely secondary market outside of the mainstream financial sector developed in the use of 
such benchmarks, such as in corporate lending or between peer lenders and borrowers, that is still 
beneficial to the mainstream financial sector as connections and linkages with financial institutions 
can be made in the web of transactions and risk management. In sum, ‘primary plus secondary use’ 
benchmarks are inherently susceptible to free-riding as they are by nature not difficult to distribute, 
and producers do not have incentives either to limit distribution.  
Where ‘public indices’ are concerned, the producers have information dissemination and public 
education in mind and it would be contrary to the nature of such indices to limit distribution for 
profit. Public indices arguably attain the status of public goods. Where a benchmark may be capable 
of ‘primary plus secondary use’, there arises the asymmetry of power between producers and users, 
giving rise to opportunities for abuse, such as in the LIBOR manipulation scandal. This problem is 
particularly acute with the by-product indices. 
Where a ‘primary plus secondary use’ benchmark becomes widely disseminated and used, 
secondary users are free-riders in the market. But this Section argues that they should be regarded 
as stakeholders, because secondary users, although being free-riders, are not ‘squatters’. Their 
adoption and use of a financial benchmark adds value to the benchmark by collective affirmation, 
strengthening a benchmark’s appeal and leadership. This is beneficial to the primary users as a 
positive feedback loop effect that reinforces the credibility of that benchmark. Hence, primary users 
have no incentive to limit secondary use and do not take steps to inhibit such use, on the contrary, 
the promotion of secondary use is encouraged. Hence, free-riding secondary users should be treated 
as stakeholders in the relevant benchmark. This article argues that the ‘stakeholder’ framing of 
secondary users of such a benchmark allows us to derive an appropriate scope for considering what 
benchmarks ought to be governed so as to take into account of stakeholders’ interests that are not 
represented in the production process. 
The needs of secondary users as stakeholders revolve around the maintenance of the quality of the 
benchmark as a perceived ‘best-price determination mechanism’ and the comparability effects 
brought about by contractual standardisation around the well-accepted benchmark.  Even if free-
riders do not participate in benchmark production and do not have an initial right in demanding that 
the benchmark they have come to adopt meets certain quality expectations, their persistent reliance 
may give rise to certain legitimate expectations due to their trust and reliance, and a grave 
disappointment in the quality of the benchmark would result in uncertainty for transactions and 
market instability. The recognition of stakeholder interests means that we should consider how the 
accountability gap to stakeholders should be addressed. Further, the vulnerability of stakeholders in 
their reliance upon benchmark quality could become a wider issue of market confidence. Where a 
well-accepted ‘primary plus secondary use’ benchmark like LIBOR is concerned, the conditions of 
production have remained unchanged for primary use22 and have become disengaged from the 
implications of widespread secondary use of the benchmark. Under these conditions, the setting of 
the benchmark does not take into account of stakeholder interests or accountability to stakeholders, 
and hence does not promise that its quality can be relied upon. Further, the setting of the 
benchmark can be susceptible to opaque manipulation contrary to secondary users’ interests, which 
is revealed to have taken place with respect to many major banks involved in the LIBOR setting 
process.23  
Hence, the appropriate scope of regulatory governance for benchmarks should comprise of ‘primary 
plus secondary use’ benchmarks where a governance deficit occurs due to the estrangement 
between production and secondary use and where secondary user trust and confidence could 
become a wider issue affecting market stability. The extension of regulatory governance over such 
benchmarks can be justified on two fronts. First, the secondary user base consists of stakeholders 
who are affected by and not able to exert governance over the integrity of the benchmark, and 
hence this is a governance deficit. One may argue that the governance deficit is the private trade-off 
for free-riding and hence regulatory governance should not intervene to make the stakeholders’ 
positions better. However, one could also counter-argue that if we accept secondary users as 
legitimate stakeholders, then the governance deficit is a market failure and hence warrants 
regulatory intervention. Nevertheless and secondly, where the stakeholder base is large, the nature 
of the governance deficit may become a concern in public interest due to the scale of social reliance 
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and the needs of overall market confidence. The rationale for introducing a regulatory framework 
for governing benchmarks is thus based on the public interest of protecting market stability, even if 
such public interest arises as a consequence of the widespread adoption of a private market good. 
This public interest rationale endorses the position of secondary users as stakeholders of benchmark 
production processes, even if they are free-riders to begin with. In instituting governance reforms 
for ‘primary plus secondary use’ benchmarks such as LIBOR, and other ‘price-determination’ 
benchmarks highlighted in the Fair and Effective Markets Review,24 public authorities seem to have 
taken the same position- that benchmark production needs to conform to certain stakeholder 
expectations in order to maintain trust in and use of the benchmark.  In addition to LIBOR,  the Fair 
and Effective Markets Review25 recommends that six other widely-used benchmarks that function as 
price-determination mechanisms be subject to governance and oversight and these 
recommendations have been taken up by the FCA which will include those benchmarks in its 
regulatory regime from April 2015.26  
The next Section elaborates on why market-based governance is insufficient for financial 
benchmarks subject to ‘primary plus secondary use’, hereinafter known as the ‘regulable 
benchmark’. The Section also explains how and to what extent regulatory governance can fill in the 
governance deficit for such benchmarks. 
B. Balancing Regulatory and Market-based Governance- An Appropriate Approach to 
Governing Regulable Benchmarks 
The governance deficit in relation to the regulable benchmark can arise in two respects: one, in 
relation to the lack of policing against fraud or manipulation of the benchmark, and two in relation 
to the lack of assurance over the continued quality of the benchmark.  Secondary users are 
interested in maintaining the integrity and credibility of the benchmark but they are unable to (a) 
detect or enforce against wrong-doing that damages the quality of the benchmark, ie ex post 
sanctions against those that have conducted damage to the benchmark; and (b) neither are they 
able to contribute to the ex ante processes that derive the benchmark.  
Can it be argued that the first-mentioned governance deficit can be addressed by ex post private law 
actions and hence there is no real deficit that needs to be addressed? This article argues that private 
law regimes may not address free-rider/stakeholder grievances and hence the first-mentioned 
governance deficit exists as an ‘enforcement deficit’ where secondary users are concerned. Of 
course one can argue that there is no real enforcement deficit if secondary users have no right of 
expectations against benchmark producers to begin with. However, this argument is not satisfactory 
as it is merely formalistic, ignores the reality of secondary users as stakeholders and the real impact 
of the social utility of the benchmark upon market confidence in general. Nevertheless, existing 
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private law sanctions may not cater for such secondary users as private law regimes are not set up 
for dealing with issues of interests that straddle the private and public spheres.  
First, it is unlikely that secondary users of regulable benchmarks would be able to argue that 
benchmark producers owe them a duty of care in tort. Where financial benchmarks for price 
determination are concerned, there are benchmark submitters who convey quote or trade 
information, and who are primary users of the benchmarks themselves, and benchmark 
administrators who are aggregators or consolidators of such information and apply certain 
calculation processes to arrive at the benchmark for the relevant timeframe. The relational nexus 
exists between benchmark submitters and administrators. Thus, it would be challenging to argue 
that secondary users are owed a duty of care by either benchmark submitters or administrators. This 
would be different where a stock market index benchmark is concerned. Such index producers use 
proprietary methodologies to aggregate and process certain publicly available information in order 
to arrive at the benchmark for a determined group of licensed users. This set-up has a closed 
network of contractual relations as between the benchmark provider and licensed users only, and 
hence licensed users are likely to be able to seek redress in contract or tort actions where grievances 
arise.   
The principles of tort law require a relationship of proximity between non-contractual parties for the 
forseeability of harm in order to impose a duty of care on such parties.27 Benchmark submitters are 
unlikely to foresee the scope of free-riders that would be affected by their submission of quotes or 
trade information. It may be argued that benchmark submitters could reasonably foresee that free-
riding may take place, but the scope of persons who are likely to free-ride would be difficult to 
determine on an ex ante basis, or would simply be too large for the ‘duty of care’ mechanism to 
cope with.  Further, individual benchmark submitters cannot be said to owe duties of care to free-
riders as it would be impossible to foresee how individual submissions, which need to be aggregated, 
could affect the financial interests of any individual free-rider. Further, it could be argued that free-
riders sign up for the variability of benchmark-linked price determination anyway and hence they 
should tolerate a margin of price uncertainty, and would find it hard to argue what financial losses 
they have incurred if benchmarks are not set optimally. Benchmark administrators are also unlikely 
to owe a duty of care to secondary users based on the unlikely prospect of establishing proximity 
with a wide and indeterminate scope of persons whose myriad financial interests are difficult to 
‘foresee’. It would also be difficult to impeach the processes benchmark administrators apply to 
aggregation and consolidation with a view to proving causation of loss to any individual secondary 
user. 
Next, secondary users are unlikely able to seek redress in the private law regime of 
misrepresentation. Redress under misrepresentation is available to parties in a pre-contractual 
relationship, and free-riders are unlikely to be able to satisfy the relational aspects for 
misrepresentation actions. Primary users of financial benchmarks may be able to have redress in 
misrepresentation for grievances surrounding benchmark production.  For example, companies that 
were sold interest rate swaps by the banks indicted in the LIBOR-rigging scandal could potentially 
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make the banks contractually liable for misrepresentation. The manipulation of LIBOR carried out by 
one department of the bank could bring into question the appropriateness of using LIBOR as a price 
determination mechanism in such contracts, and a bank could be potentially impeached for 
misrepresenting the appropriateness of the financial benchmark as a price determining 
mechanism.28  However, where secondary users unrelated to the benchmark production processes 
use LIBOR to price their contracts, they have no interest in suing each other but would not be able to 
implicate benchmark producers who are beyond the parameters of the contract.  
Even if the above hurdle in lack of contractual relations is overcome, it is arguable that benchmark 
submitters sending in quotes are sending in ‘opinions’ and hence not actionable as 
misrepresentations of fact,29 although there is case law to suggest that an opinion that is not 
honestly held can amount to a misrepresentation.30   Quotes could be treated as opinions if they are 
estimates made in response to a hypothetical question, such as ‘At what rate could you ... accept 
inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?’ It could be argued that even if 
there is transactional data or similar data that allows the lender to come to a reasoned response, 
such a response is still an opinion and not likely to be actionable as misrepresentation. In a similar 
fashion, the treatment of credit rating agencies’ ratings in private law is that they are opinions, 
although based on reasoned analyses of information.31  
 Moreover, as benchmark administrators have to aggregate and consolidate information, and 
processes such as a trimmed average is in place for quote-based submissions such as LIBOR (in order 
to mitigate the effect of outlying submissions), it would be difficult to allege what ultimately 
constitutes the ‘misrepresented fact’ upon which the free-rider is relying. Further, what window 
period of transactions would be regarded as affected and therefore compensable?  It may also be 
argued that secondary users who benefit from the free-riding of financial benchmarks are unlikely 
the group of persons to incur the cost of private litigation, and also suffer from the collective action 
problem. Thus, the usefulness of private law remedies for such stakeholders would be rather remote. 
In sum, private law mechanisms are unlikely to address stakeholders’ interest in enforcing against 
fraudulent or other damaging actions to a regulable benchmark. 
Next, it is even less likely that secondary users would be able to influence the ex ante processes for 
quality assurance of a regulable benchmark as they are by nature free-riders that take the 
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benchmark as it is. Existing market structures are unlikely to provide participatory avenues for 
secondary users to influence the production processes of a regulable benchmark.  
However, can the governance deficits discussed above be addressed only by recourse to regulatory 
governance? Regulatory governance can often over-reach and it may be premature to dismiss the 
applicability of market-based governance. The regulable benchmark is a private market good to 
begin with and one should consider if there is still an appropriate role for market-based governance. 
This Section argues that there still needs to be a balance between regulatory governance and 
market-based governance in addressing the governance deficits of regulable benchmarks. This is 
because the regulable benchmark has not by reason of its governance deficits and therefore its need 
for a certain extent of regulatory governance, become a public good per se. Further, this Section will 
argue that regulatory governance needs to be based on a defined scope of public interest to be 
protected and market-based governance remains appropriate for certain aspects of benchmark 
governance. 
The regulable benchmark caters for a useful purpose of price determination in longer term contracts 
with a variable price element. Its adoption by many does not make it an indispensable or regulable 
public good32  as the public good characterisation brings about certain hazards. A public good 
characterisation of any financial benchmark may entrench a benchmark. A financial benchmark 
essentially serves private transactional needs and so its development should be tested in the market 
and subject to bottom-up affirmation of its quality and reliability. Regulatory endorsement could 
distort the natural processes in the market for testing benchmark quality. Further, the public good 
characterisation of a financial benchmark may truncate possibilities of innovation in the 
development of new and alternative benchmarks in the market for user choice. This Section is of the 
view that a public good characterisation of the regulable benchmark is inappropriate, as this may 
foreclose possibilities of achieving a balance between regulatory and market-based governance that 
best harnesses the social utility of the regulable benchmark.  
Arguably, the public good that public authorities are interested in preserving is not the benchmark in 
question, but the benefits brought about by the adoption of that benchmark and the systemic 
implications from such widespread adoption. A widely-used benchmark reduces the transaction cost 
of price determination in incomplete contractual relationships and makes it cost-effective for many 
incomplete contractual relationships to be entered into in confidence. The widely-used benchmark 
promotes access to transactions and hence a form of democratisation of finance through transaction 
cost-reduction. The public good that therefore needs to be provided is the framework for 
transaction cost-reduction in order to supply avenues for democratisation of finance, and the 
maintenance of a form of stability in the widespread reliance upon such transaction-cost reduction 
frameworks.  
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Thus, the scope of regulatory governance should be based on (a) promoting the development of 
transaction-cost reduction devices; (b) ensuring that  where a financial benchmark has attained a 
certain threshold of widespread and secondary use, its production should be appropriately 
accountable to primary and secondary users,  and (c) selectively intervening only for the purposes of 
providing overall market stability in a crisis where widespread disruption or damage to secondary 
users’ interest could result in a loss of market confidence and systemic instability. Regulators should 
maintain the balance of refraining from distorting the market for benchmarks by adopting or 
endorsing any financial benchmark and but also ensure that there is a strong hand to maintain 
market confidence and stability should there be a crisis related to secondary use.  In sum, a balanced 
approach of proportionate regulatory governance and useful market-based governance would be 
the optimal framework to govern regulable benchmarks. 
The next Section turns to explaining how an optimal regulatory regime can be designed and maps 
this analysis onto a critical comparison of the existing regulatory regimes.  
C. The Optimal Features of a Regulatory Framework for Regulable Benchmarks and 
Comparative Discussion of the Current Regulatory Regimes 
This article suggests that the appropriate extent of regulatory governance for regulable benchmarks 
should be a balanced one that optimally harnesses the positive attributes of market-based 
governance while addressing governance deficits that relate to the public goods that regulators are 
protecting: market confidence and stability. This Section suggests that regulatory governance should 
deal with: (a) the supply of public ex post sanctions where regulable benchmarks have been 
manipulated and (b) regulatory intervention in the attrition and transition of regulable benchmarks 
in ‘crises’. It is suggested that regulatory governance should be more nuanced in dealing with ex 
ante governance frameworks for regulable benchmarks in view of concerns regarding market 
distortions and the inability of regulators to warrant benchmark quality anyway. This area is 
suggested to be left to a mixture of soft law and market-based governance. This would be different 
from the approach in current regulatory regimes and we will explain why. 
Regulatory Sanctions for Benchmark Manipulation 
As argued above, the public good that authorities are providing in relation to regulable benchmarks 
is that of a regulatory framework that supports transaction-cost reduction in order to democratise 
access to financial transactions, without entrenching particular benchmarks. Hence, such a 
regulatory framework should at a minimum seek to deter anti-social behaviour that is aimed at 
undermining the transaction-cost reduction devices that enjoy widespread stakeholder use, and to 
punish such behaviour in a socially visible manner if it occurs. 
Anti-social behaviour such as manipulation of LIBOR by the submission of false or collusive quotes, 
or the manipulation of foreign exchange prices such as the London 4pm fix by collusive trading 
behaviour and information exchange33 are designed to benefit the few at the expense of damaging 
the social trust built up in the transaction-cost reduction devices of LIBOR and the WM Reuters 4pm 
fix. The undermining of social trust in widely-used financial benchmarks can result in significant 
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transaction costs for parties if price determination becomes much more complex and costly in the 
absence of a viable benchmark. Hence, anti-social behaviour that damages the quality and credibility 
of a widely-used benchmark can be subject to criminal and administrative penalties not because the 
benchmark as such is to be protected, but that there has been deliberate and unthinking 
undermining of the public good of a generally trusted and accepted transaction-cost reduction 
framework. On that basis, criminal and administrative penalties should be meted out to the rogue 
traders who have specifically engaged in benchmark manipulation. There may be a sliding scale of 
probity where many individuals may be implicated due to toxic organisational and sectoral culture. 
Hence, regulation should provide for the more severe punishments to be meted out for deliberate 
acts of manipulation, and acts of manipulation with reckless indifference as to consequences for the 
social profile and integrity of the benchmark. Less severe punishments may be meted out to persons 
who assist in the manipulation process as a result of lack of care, diligence or oversight. The social 
profile and importance of widely-used benchmarks would warrant an approach of strict liability for 
the organisations for whom the rogue traders are working. This deterrent effect could incentivise 
the management of such organisations to install systems and processes to prevent such behaviour, 
and to institute a proper culture.  
The pursuit of wrong-doing individuals is necessary as some wrong-doers are deviants in an 
organisational set-up and therefore should be treated separately from the organisation concerned. 
In this respect, the UK Serious Fraud Office’s prosecutions against bankers for LIBOR rigging34 are 
appropriate and on the right track. The pursuit of individuals should not be daunted by the prospect 
of a large scope of persons who may be indicted. Further, the UK financial regulator has powers to 
disqualify certain individuals from holding certain positions in a financial institution, and such 
disqualification powers,35 which have the effect of truncating a person’s career and affecting his/her 
professional reputation, should provide some deterrent incentives.  
As for large deterrent fines imposed on financial institutions for whom the rogue traders worked, 
this article is more sceptical of the size of fines levied.36 This article is of the view that organisations 
that have succumbed to toxic unethical cultures may benefit from such deterrent punishment to 
kickstart changes in organisational systems and culture. Many commentators37 have shed light on 
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the toxic culture of the banking sector, especially where trading and investment are concerned. 
Santoro and Strauss argue that modern banking culture causes profit generation to become 
disengaged from the generation of social utility,38 and banking culture is characterised by high risk-
taking, individualistic behaviour, short-termism, blindness to stakeholders, and a lack of cooperation. 
Gapper39 and Leadsom,40 writing in the Financial Times in the wake of the Barclays LIBOR fixing 
scandal of 2012, lament the selfish and unethical culture41 that has developed in contemporary 
banks, especially investment banks. However, one has to bear in mind that a number of the 
punished organisations have already begun programmes of cultural overhaul since the global 
financial crisis and the punishment should perhaps have taken into account of this when levying 
fines for historical wrongful behaviour. It is important to strike a balance between levying a financial 
penalty that is indisputably socially visible42 and incentivising constructive cultural change. Further, if 
organisations have reasonably sound systems of internal control but fail to detect the determined 
deviant, this article advocates that the individual deviant should be punished more spectacularly 
than the organisation, in which case, a smaller fine may be warranted for the organisation. In order 
to support organisations in detecting deviants, it is also important for regulators to encourage that 
financial institutions institute sound whistle-blowing policies,43 a point that has been taken up by 
most of the governance frameworks discussed below.  
Next, we argue that it is inappropriate for regulatory governance to become too prescriptive about 
the quality of the benchmark as such. We will explain why market-based governance may play a 
significant role in this area, and also examine the current regulatory frameworks which have all 
taken a somewhat different approach. 
Design of an Ex Ante Governance Framework for the Quality of Regulable Benchmarks 
This article is sceptical of regulatory prescriptions that relate to the quality of any financial 
benchmark as these prescriptions may entrench certain benchmarks, inhibit future market 
innovation and distort the market for benchmarks (for example where benchmark incumbents 
engage in rent-extraction behaviour as their legitimacy is now protected by regulation and shielded 
from market competition). Users are likely to regard compliance as a proxy for benchmark quality 
and would not undertake efforts to determine for themselves if they are satisfied with the 
benchmark quality. This is due to users’ behavioural bias towards seeking informational shortcuts 
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and proxies, a behavioural heuristic known as ‘satisficing’. Installing a regulatory framework for the 
ex ante governance of financial benchmarks is likely to reinforce blind user reliance.  
At one end, regulatory governance could mean taking over the production of the benchmark 
altogether. This has been regarded as unwise by most commentators and is (rightly) not the 
approach in current regulatory regimes. A number of commentators opine that an optimal ex ante 
framework for benchmark production would not need to involve regulators in taking over the 
production of the benchmark. Kreicher et al44 have argued that users have long favoured private 
sector produced benchmarks over government ones as the latter are prone to instability when policy 
changes or macro-economic or political shocks occur.  
The approach of current regulatory frameworks does not involve regulatory management of 
benchmark production but it involves regulatory prescription for benchmark administrators in terms 
of their governance, production processes and methodology. In this light, Verstein argues that ex 
ante forms of governance would only give rise to cosmetic compliance and unintended 
consequences that arise from unnecessary prescriptions, and it would be better to rely on robust ex 
post enforcement for fraud.45 This Section also argues that regulatory governance in this area should 
be a form of facilitative soft law in order to overcome some collective action problems, but should 
be proportionate in order not to over-reach into the quality of regulable benchmarks. The quality of 
regulable benchmarks is an area that can still be usefully developed subject to market-based 
governance. The design of such a facilitative soft law framework is supported by a user-centric 
perspective, as we shall discuss below. 
The (Secondary) User Perspective 
What do secondary user stakeholders legitimately expect of the quality of a widely-used benchmark? 
Arguably, they value others’ trust in the benchmark, as widespread affirmation and endorsement of 
the benchmark provides the necessary comparability users need to make financial decisions. Hence, 
users’ trust in a benchmark is not so much based on users being convinced themselves of the 
reliability of the benchmark or the qualities of benchmark submitters and administrators. Users’ 
trust is based on the behavioural tendency towards herding in a collective or popular direction.  
Hence, ex ante governance frameworks designed to improve user scrutiny or accountability to users 
are unlikely to be effective. Moreover, the tendency towards herding behaviour by secondary user 
stakeholders is likely to engender a systemic consequence, i.e. widespread use and therefore 
systemic impact if the benchmark should fail or be severely impeached. Regulatory prescription in 
relation to benchmark quality will likely entrench users’ blind reliance and herding behaviour, while 
not necessarily being able to guarantee benchmark quality. This article hence advocates caution in 
taking a prescriptive approach to governing benchmark production and prefers to explore avenues in 
soft law and market-based governance to encourage a race to the top in benchmark production. 
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 The article argues that a soft law approach could be used in the design of an incentive-based 
framework to encourage benchmark producers to excel. Further, this framework should be 
supported by strong regulatory intervention if a crisis occurs in relation to a benchmark. A crisis-
based intervention approach would ensure that there is a backstop to market confidence while not 
excessively interfering with the development of benchmark quality in normal times.  
Further, a soft law framework that provides incentives for best practices in benchmark production to 
develop could entail a race to the top in regulatory competition. National financial markets can 
become deeper and more attractive if the use of financial benchmarks tied to these national 
markets is widespread even at the international level. The UK’s interest in preserving the integrity of 
certain regulable benchmarks in connection with LIBOR, the London fix for foreign exchange or the 
London gold fix is tied to its interest in maintaining a dominant position for transactions based on 
these benchmarks that come to London markets. Hence, a facilitative form of regulatory governance 
could further the purpose of regulatory competition that supports national markets in their 
internationally competitive position. 
It is suggested that the soft law framework for benchmark production should be adapted from the 
current regulatory regimes. In this light, this Section now turns to a comparative presentation of the 
UK regime for benchmark governance46  (instituted in the wake of the LIBOR scandal), the OICU-
IOSCO framework,47 the EBA-ESMA guidelines48 for the European Union and proposed legislation49 
that is being debated in the EU. This Section will critically discuss the relevant features of the current 
regimes that should be adapted into a soft law framework in order to encourage an appropriate 
level of market-based governance.  
Comparative Discussion of Regulatory Governance of Benchmark Administration 
The current regulatory frameworks all adopt an approach whereby benchmark administrators are 
subject to rather extensive procedure-oriented regulation to ensure the robustness of their 
processes and their oversight of benchmark submitters. The Table below describes the obligations 
that benchmark administrators are subject to, including the institution of robust governance and 
internal control processes, the management of conflicts of interest, the institution of Codes of 
Conduct for benchmark submitters and oversight of benchmark submitters, the use of certain 
prescribed methodology in deriving the benchmark and reporting to regulators if not the public.  
This article is of the view that the governance frameworks for benchmark administrators are more or 
less prescriptive to a similar extent. As with much of procedure-oriented regulation,  supervisory 
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review50 and oversight is necessary to ensure that the regulated engage in spirited compliance with 
the rules. However, this Section argues that much of the prescribed practices for benchmark 
administrators in governance and methodology are likely to impose significant cost upon benchmark 
administrators and it is queried to what extent benchmark quality is really achieved. Further, this 
Section argues that the approach of delegating significant oversight of benchmark submitters to 
benchmark administrators is misplaced and would fall short of the objective of the regulatory regime 
in ensuring that benchmark production fulfils the public good of transaction-cost reduction and 
maintenance of market stability. 
Table for Comparison of the UK, IOSCO and EU approaches to regulating benchmark administrators: 
 UK FCA MAR 8 OICU-IOSCO EBA/ESMA guidelines/ 
proposed EU 
legislation 
Governance structure Somewhat meta-
regulatory51 in nature: 
‘effective 
organisational and 
governance 
arrangements’ 
Appointment of 
benchmark 
administration 
manager responsible 
for compliance 
Regular review and 
surveillance of quality 
of benchmark 
submissions 
Institution of internal 
whistle-blowing 
procedures 
‘credible and 
transparent 
governance and 
oversight’ 
Expertise of 
benchmark 
administrators 
Institution of internal 
control framework for 
management of 
conflicts of interest 
and ensuring 
compliance 
Whistleblowing 
framework 
Internal control for 
data collection 
‘effective governance 
and compliance 
processes to ensure 
the quality of the 
benchmark’ 
Appropriate criteria for 
appointment of 
members of governing 
bodies or compliance 
Internal control 
mechanisms for 
administrator, 
submitters and other 
third party outsources 
Internal control over 
quality of data 
submitted 
Whistle-blowing 
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Appointment of 
internal or external 
auditor who is 
independent to 
periodically report on 
administrator’s 
compliance 
Record keeping of all 
data, submissions, 
policies etc for 5 years 
procedures 
Disciplinary procedures 
Record keeping of all 
oversight committee’s 
meetings with 
administrator, third 
parties etc for 5 years 
Record keeping of all 
data used for 
benchmark calculation 
to enable external 
audit 
Limitations on 
outsourcing unless 
adequate supervision 
of outsourcees can be 
put in place 
Governance principles Organisational and 
governance 
arrangements to 
identify and manage 
conflicts of interest 
Ensuring 
confidentiality of 
benchmark 
submissions 
Management of 
conflicts of interest in 
prescribed detail down 
to staff reporting lines, 
segregation of 
responsibilities and 
staff remuneration 
Robustness of 
operations such as 
contingency measures 
for failures in inputs or 
markets or critical 
functions 
Management of 
conflicts of interest 
 
Accountability Institution of oversight 
committee 
represented by 
submitters, markets 
and non-executive 
directors of the 
administrator 
Code of practice for 
benchmark submitters 
Institution of 
independent oversight 
function to review 
benchmark quality and 
methodology, 
outsourcing, 
commissioning internal 
or external audits 
Oversight committee 
Oversight function or 
committee 
Committee has power 
to directly report 
irregularities to 
regulator 
Proposed Directive: 
External audit 
Determining scope, 
definition and 
methodologies for 
benchmark  
Review of benchmark 
submissions and 
quality 
to also monitor for 
benchmark 
manipulation, code of 
conduct for submitters 
Methodology None prescribed General principle of 
‘accurate and reliable 
representation of the 
economic realities of 
the Interest it seeks to 
measure, and 
eliminate factors that 
might result in a 
distortion of the price, 
rate, index or value of 
the Benchmark’ 
Data sufficiency 
required, preference 
for transaction-based 
data in active markets, 
that are bona fides, 
arms-length 
transactions. 
Hierarchy of data input 
to be constructed, with 
preference for market 
data above but 
permitting quotes, bids 
and offer data 
Explicit setting out of 
methodology for 
calculation to be made 
at least to 
stakeholders, term 
undefined 
General principle of 
‘Benchmark should 
represent adequately 
the market, strategy or 
interest to which it 
refers, and measure 
the performance of a 
representative group 
of underlyings in a 
relevant and 
appropriate way’ 
Methodologies must 
be rigorous, systematic 
and continuous, similar 
to the regulation of 
credit ratings quality52 
Preference for 
transaction-based 
data, permitting non-
transaction data  
Proposed Directive: 
safeguards needed 
where input data is 
mainly not transaction-
based data and any 
submitter contributes 
to more than 50% of 
value of transactions in 
market 
Proposed Directive: 
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Input data hierarchy to 
be clearly established 
Proposed Directive: 
Expert judgment can 
be used subject to 
transparent and clear 
guidelines 
Methodologies to be 
subject to regular 
review 
Methodologies subject 
to public transparency 
 
Oversight of third 
parties 
Not explicit but can be 
inferred from meta-
regulatory provisions 
on effective 
organisational and 
governance 
arrangements in order 
to ensure due 
administration and 
publication of 
benchmark 
Written policies and 
procedures to manage 
outsourced third 
parties 
Monitor third parties 
for compliance 
Contingency 
arrangements if third 
parties fail to deliver 
Transparency of third 
parties’ identities to 
relevant regulators and 
stakeholders, term 
undefined 
Proposed Directive: 
Adequate supervision 
of outsourcees 
ESMA/EBA: Direct 
guidelines addressed 
to benchmark 
calculation agents and 
benchmark publishers 
in terms of having 
robust internal 
governance for 
compliance, conflicts 
of interest 
management, error 
detection and 
certification of 
compliance to 
administrator 
Transparency Only to regulator To regulators, as per 
below 
To stakeholders, in 
terms of benchmark 
methodologies, third 
party outsources, 
conflicts of interest 
and policies, and 
EBA/ESMA: Disclosure 
of governance and 
compliance committee 
members to public 
Disclosure of 
benchmark 
methodology to public 
Proposed Directive: 
transition policies for 
benchmarks 
Complaints procedure 
for benefit of 
stakeholders 
Transparency of 
benchmark data 
subject to Commission 
delegated legislation 
EBA/ESMA: 
Certification of 
compliance to public 
EBA/ESMA: Complaints 
procedures but 
uncertain whether 
internal or external 
EBA/ESMA: Direct 
guidelines addressed 
to users viz users must 
use sufficient due 
diligence to ascertain 
that all parties in the 
benchmark production 
processes comply with 
guidelines; and that 
users must regularly 
assess the suitability 
and relevance of a 
benchmark 
Relations with 
regulator 
Notification to FCA of 
suspected breaches by 
administrator or 
submitter 
Notification to FCA of 
suspected benchmark 
manipulation 
Reporting to FCA daily 
on all benchmark 
submissions 
Providing FCA with 
quarterly aggregate 
statistics 
All documents and 
audit trail to be 
available to regulator 
Disclosure of conflicts 
of interest and policies 
Proposed Directive: 
Registration system for 
benchmark 
administrators, 
recognition of third 
country administrators 
based on equivalence 
and allowing 
registered 
administrators to use 
third country 
benchmark based on 
equivalent supervision 
and arrangement in 
place with ESMA.  
Scrutiny over 
benchmark 
methodology  
EBA/ESMA: Scrutiny 
over audit trail and 
oversight committee’s 
meetings 
EBA/ESMA: Reporting 
of suspected 
irregularities, Proposed 
Directive will leave the 
specifics to delegated 
Commission legislation 
EBA/ESMA: 
Cooperation with 
regulators over any 
other query 
 
 
At a global level, all three approaches53 have ramped up prescriptions for administrators’ 
governance structures. The requirements to institute written policies, clear and transparent 
governance structures and procedures such as the oversight committee, internal control 
mechanisms, audit trails and irregularity detection mechanisms mean that existing benchmark 
administrators have to structurally overhaul their processes and practices, or that the opportunity 
may be taken for incumbent administrators to be challenged by re-tendering. The landscape of 
benchmark administration may change significantly especially at the conclusion of the UK Fair and 
Effective Markets Review in mid-2015. For example, the surrender of administration functions from 
existing institutions to other bodies may emerge, such as the ICE’s triumph over the British Banking 
Association in taking over LIBOR administration.54 New bodies such as exchanges like the ICE are 
well-placed to engage with benchmark administration as they naturally have transaction data and 
even pre-transaction data, and such is increasingly necessary to underpin benchmark production. 
Regulators however should beware the incentives that drive new bodies to take on relatively 
expensive benchmark administration. The emergence of bodies that may become systemically 
important due to their control over a significant benchmark or benchmarks must be considered. ICE 
has already gained administration rights over LIBOR, ISDAFIX and the LBMA Gold Fix. Further, ICE is 
generating revenues through licensing use, and this article queries if this is the effect intended to be 
achieved by regulators.  
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Licensing use may unduly inhibit free access to a socially useful transaction-cost-reduction 
mechanism, which is the underlying public good regulators should protect. Nevertheless, it is noted 
that ICE does make historic LIBOR data available to the public 3 days late.55 However, allowing 
secondary user stakeholders to free-ride on delayed information still does not detract from the fact 
that preferential treatment is given to subscribers. It is queried if this unequal treatment would 
prejudice the retail market and allow financial institutions to further exploit secondary users as they 
would likely have an advantage in accessing current price information. The strengthening of 
governance structures comes at a cost and it is queried whether the unintended consequence of the 
new governance structures would be another form of undermining the secondary users’ stake in 
having a reliable transaction-cost reduction mechanism! It is suggested that the regulator should 
monitor the impact of delayed publication to free-riders and consider whether the retail market is 
prejudiced in due course.  
Further, concerns have been reported as to whether the cost of subscription to use financial 
benchmarks such as LIBOR may become too forbidding and cause primary users such as banks and 
financial institutions to move away from LIBOR.56 If so, the endeavours to strengthen the governance 
of benchmarks such as LIBOR, which inevitably impose cost, would ironically result in the instability 
of the benchmark as primary users defect. The rationale of benchmark regulation in order to protect 
secondary user stakeholders would be undermined by primary users’ defection. The benchmark may 
become unstable and lose its comparable appeal from decreased use. The three current frameworks 
presented above have foreseen possible benchmark migration and instability and have put in 
measures to address those situations. However, this Section will shortly discuss the limitations in 
those measures especially in relation to distortions of healthy market forces. This problem highlights 
the difficulty in designing appropriate governance frameworks where market-based forces are 
dynamic. 
It is also queried whether benchmark administrators who incur significant sunk costs in governance 
and methodology investments would become practically irremoveable.  If so, we are exchanging one 
problem for another, i.e. in return for apparently fixing the reliability of benchmarks for widespread 
secondary use, we may install benchmark administrators who become too dominant, such that the 
social trust in such institutions could become a systemic risk issue.57 The importance of benchmark 
administrators would then demand greater supervisory scrutiny and dedication of regulatory 
resources to that. All three frameworks outlined above seem to agree on extensive supervisory 
powers on the part of the regulator to look into documents, practices, and subject benchmark 
administrators to supervisory review. In view of certain administrators’ likely systemic impact, 
perhaps the UK FCA should undertakes C1 level review of such administrators, according to its 
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supervisory intensity framework.58 Further, it would be imperative to look into whether there are 
other actors in the regulatory space that could monitor benchmark administrators. The OICU-IOSCO 
and European authorities’ guidelines also envisage stakeholder and public scrutiny, through 
mandatory disclosure of certain aspects such as benchmark production methodology and selected 
governance issues.  Some commentators59 have queried whether public transparency is ideal as this 
allows room for benchmark submitters to collude more easily.60 This article also doubts that the 
secondary user base which carries out free-riding can be motivated to be diligent and act as 
monitors of benchmark administrators.  This article is of the view that the current regulatory 
regimes could entrench benchmark administrators and there needs to be considered reflection on 
the needs of appropriate supervision and monitoring of such bodies in line with the regulatory 
expectations placed on them. 
Further, the OICU-IOSCO and European initiatives make somewhat detailed prescriptions for the 
methodology in benchmark production. Although the UK approach is silent on such prescription at 
the moment, this approach would likely have to fall into line when European legislation comes into 
force.61 Detailed prescriptions may run the risk of becoming out-dated, but this approach may be 
inevitable if the regulation of benchmark administrators ushers in a handful of entrenched and 
powerful benchmark administrators. Further, compliance costs will be incurred by benchmark 
administrators who have to conform to the prescribed practices. For example, the relatively low cost 
methodology in getting bank quotes for LIBOR submissions from a limited panel must give way to 
more sophisticated methods of combining wider panel bank quotes with real transaction data such 
as in overnight index swaps, repo markets etc. The investment in data collection and assimilation as 
well as methodological systems would be costly. The mandatory requirement to regularly review 
and perhaps back-test the credibility of benchmarks would also be costly. The cost implications 
reinforce the concerns suggested above regarding new administrator monopolies and limitations 
upon accessing the use of the benchmark by secondary users. Regulators need to revisit this trade-
off in due course to look into whether the benefits to secondary user stakeholders are compromised. 
In view of the potential market distortion effects of regulating benchmark administration and the 
potential of adversely affecting the interests of secondary users, the protection of which motivated 
the introduction of regulatory governance to begin with, it is suggested that benchmark 
administrators should be subject to a more reflexive, soft law-type governance framework that 
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encourages the adoption of best practices. This article suggests that regulators could set up a Code 
of Best Practice in relation to internal governance, control, structure and use of methodology by 
benchmark administrators. Adherence to the Code may provide a basis for regulators to award 
administration rights, which should be put out to tender on a competitive basis every 3-5 years. Such 
a system would prevent entrenchment of certain benchmark administrators and incentivise them 
towards best practices without making best practices a costly and compliance-based issue. The Code 
should also not prescribe detailed methodologies but could draw upon prevailing research by 
independent scholars62 and make recommendations which should be regularly revised.  
This article further believes reflexive or soft law to be a more appropriate framework for benchmark 
administrators because not much would be achieved by regulatory enforcement against breach of 
regulatory requirements anyway. If administrators do a poor job and cause the credibility of a 
benchmark to be in doubt, enforcement action will likely reinforce the instability around the 
benchmark and damage secondary users’ interests. Further, regulators may not be able to withdraw 
the administrator’s licence in view of the impact on secondary users. In view of the lack of 
constructiveness of enforcement options, hard regulation may not achieve much and sacrifices the 
advantages of flexibility discussed above. Reflexive approaches would also mean that the 
relationship between regulators and administrators is structured not as a binary regulated-regulatee 
relationship but as a more cooperative relationship in governance partnership.63 This would likely 
reduce the burden of compliance cost for administrators and focus administrators towards the 
common good of producing socially useful benchmarks for transaction-cost reduction in the market. 
It may be argued that the potential rotation of benchmark administrators would be contrary to 
regulatory expectations placed on them to oversee benchmark submitters. However, this article 
argues that benchmark administrators should not have the primary burden of overseeing benchmark 
submitters at all. Under the current regulatory regimes, as benchmark submitters voluntarily provide 
information to administrators for the production of the benchmark, it would be difficult to subject 
submitters to regulation without making submission mandatory. Mandatory submission would 
subvert the production of the private market good for transaction cost reduction, and regulators 
possibly do not wish to go as far as recalibrating regulable benchmarks as public goods.  Hence, it 
seemed inevitable that benchmark administrators would be best placed to oversee the voluntary 
administrator-submitter relationship. As such the current regulatory regimes attempt to regulate 
administrators extensively while incentivising them to oversee submitters, taking the soft law 
approach where submitters are concerned. 
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This article will argue that the soft law approach for submitters is not preferred. In order to harness 
the optimal mix of regulatory and market-based governance, this article suggests the opposite 
approach, i.e. to rely on more soft law and market-based governance for benchmark administrators, 
and to provide regulatory governance over benchmark submitters instead. The below will present 
the three current regulatory approaches to benchmark submission and will critically discuss the 
limitations of current approaches and suggest an alternative way forward. 
Comparative Discussion of Regulatory Governance of Benchmark Submission 
 The UK, IOSCO and EBA-ESMA have all designed a procedure-oriented framework for submitters but 
direct regulatory oversight is much more limited. The Table below presents the three current 
regulatory approaches with broad similarities and minor differences.  The key commonality in all 
three approaches outlined above is that benchmark submitters are governed and overseen by 
benchmark administrators instead of regulators.  This is because benchmark submission is a 
voluntary activity and extending regulatory reach over it could at this time be regarded as excessive. 
Regulators may wish at the moment to avoid having to go as far as instituting a new system of 
mandatorising benchmark submission. However, it will be argued that this approach is 
counterproductive to the rationales for governing regulable benchmarks. Further, delegating 
oversight of benchmark submitters to administrators makes benchmark administration more costly 
and enforcement deficit is also very likely. Such enforcement deficit raises real and serious concerns 
as benchmark manipulation is carried out much more extensively at submitter level rather than at 
administrator level. Hence, the current regulatory approaches of subjecting benchmark submitters 
to administrators’ oversight are likely contrary to achieving protection for secondary 
users/stakeholders. 
 UK FCA OICU-IOSCO EBA/ESMA guidelines 
and EU legislation 
Governance structure ‘effective 
organisational and 
governance 
arrangements’ 
Appointment of 
benchmark manager to 
ensure compliance 
Responsibility for 
oversight of 
benchmark submission 
to reside with senior 
personnel 
Benchmark submitter 
to be based on UK 
Record keeping of 
Internal systems and 
controls to deal with 
-management of 
conflicts of interest 
-application of 
methodology 
-pre-submission 
validation by senior 
personnel 
-internal sign-off 
procedures for 
submission 
-whistleblowing 
policies 
Clear internal policies 
developed for 
submissions, internal 
control, training, 
record-keeping, 
compliance, internal 
audit, disciplinary 
procedures, 
complaints 
management and 
escalation 
Effective 
organisational and 
administrative 
arrangements to 
manage conflicts of 
interest, highly 
benchmark 
submissions and 
relevant data for 5 
years 
Appointment of 
independent auditor 
for yearly report on 
compliance (not 
explicit on whether 
internal or external 
auditor) 
-suspicious submission 
reporting policies 
-clear roles and 
responsibilities and 
reporting lines for key 
personnel 
Record keeping 
Training of personnel 
in terms of compliance 
with market abuse 
regulation 
prescribed eg 
EBA/ESMA: as to 
exchange of 
information between 
staff, prevention of 
collusion or exercise of 
inappropriate 
influence and 
adequate 
remuneration policies 
Adequate internal 
control mechanisms 
EBA/ESMA: Senior 
personnel named 
individually 
responsible for 
oversight of 
benchmark 
submissions 
Staff in benchmark 
submissions to have 
adequate skills, 
knowledge and 
expertise and 
compliance training 
Effective whistle-
blowing or internal 
reporting policies 
EBA/ESMA: Occasional 
external audits of 
submissions and 
procedures 
Record keeping for at 
least 5 years of  
-procedures and 
methodologies 
-names of individuals 
responsible for 
submissions and 
oversight 
-communications with 
benchmark 
administrators or other 
third parties 
-substantial exposures 
of individual traders or 
trading desks to 
Benchmark related 
instruments;  
— any transaction 
reversing positions 
subsequent to a 
submission;  
— findings of external 
or internal audits 
related to Benchmark 
submission, remedial 
actions and progress in 
their implementation 
Note Proposed 
Directive is more 
skeletal and leaves 
details to Commission 
delegated legislation 
Governance principles Management of 
conflicts of interest by 
written policy 
Rigorous detection and 
reporting of suspected 
manipulation and 
collusion 
Management of 
conflicts of interest 
Robust procedural 
internal control culture 
Management of 
conflicts of interest 
EBA/ESMA: zero-
tolerance policy, 
including disciplinary 
measures, for non-
compliance with 
internal policies 
Duties of benchmark 
submitter 
Ensuring that 
benchmark 
submissions are 
credible and robust 
In a Code that would 
be drawn up by 
benchmark 
administrator 
ESMA/EBA: 
Compliance-based, to 
certify to benchmark 
administrator 
Methodology Effective methodology 
based on objective 
Processes to 
determine input 
Transaction-based 
verifiable data to be 
criteria and relevant 
information 
Qualitative criteria 
allowed such as expert 
judgment 
Review at least every 
quarter for robustness 
and credibility of 
methodology 
eligibility 
Bona fides of input 
important criteria 
Expert judgment can 
be used 
used 
Other input or 
qualitative judgment 
can only be used 
subject to internal 
control and guidelines 
eg: EBA/ESMA: with 
senior personnel 
approval 
Accountability Information on 
methodology and use 
of quantitative and 
qualitative criteria to 
be sent regularly to 
benchmark 
administrator 
Notification of 
suspected 
manipulation or 
collusion to FCA 
Independent auditor 
for yearly report on 
compliance to be sent 
to FCA 
To benchmark 
administrator based on 
Code of Conduct 
Unclear as to where 
notification of 
suspicious activity goes 
To benchmark 
administrator based on 
Code of Conduct, 
Proposed Directive: 
Code to be approved 
by regulator for critical 
benchmarks 
ESMA/EBA: To respond 
to regulator if 
regulator makes 
queries directed at 
submitter 
Relations with 
regulator 
Unclear whether FCA 
has direct enforcement 
powers and in what 
form 
Unclear whether FCA 
has powers to directly 
investigate and call up 
documents but this 
may be subsumed 
within general powers 
FCA has under the 
Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 
Unclear if there are 
any direct relations 
ESMA/EBA: To respond 
to reasonable queries 
from regulator 
 
All three current regulatory regimes prescribe that benchmark submission should be subject to 
robust internal governance and control frameworks in firms, as well as to management of conflicts 
of interest, with the EU guidelines and proposed legislation going into the greatest amount of 
prescriptive detail. However it remains uncertain what the accountability channels for benchmark 
submission are. The approach in the UK FCA Handbook64 introduces a procedure-oriented 
framework to prescribe aspects of governance structures, principles and benchmark submission 
methodology, but at the same time, benchmark administrators are to develop a Code of Practice 
Standards for submitters.65 The FCA has general powers to carry out supervision and enforcement 
against the subjects of its regulation, and this may suggest that the FCA has direct enforcement 
powers against benchmark submitters who are subject to the prescriptions in the Handbook. But it is 
unclear if administrators have primary disciplinary jurisdiction over submitters and whether there is 
an overlap between the FCA and administrators in disciplinary jurisdiction over submitters. The 
OICU-IOSCO and EU frameworks are clearer that regulators have limited jurisdiction over benchmark 
submitters, although the regulator is expected to have oversight of the administrator’s Code for 
submitters where ‘critical benchmarks’66 are concerned. Direct regulatory governance of benchmark 
submitters may be argued to be untenable, as benchmark submission is up to voluntary participation. 
Such participation, unlike benchmark administration, is not susceptible of being a regulated activity67 
as the extension of regulatory governance to benchmark submission would just compel submitters 
to stop submitting in order to avoid compliance costs. This is counter-productive to the reliability of 
the benchmark as larger panels of submission are empirically proved to relate to more robust 
benchmarks.68 The three frameworks above are limited in being able to address the issue of 
governance at the submitter level. It seems that the comparatively extensive regulation of 
administrators may be designed to mitigate this particular aspect of impotence. However, this 
Section will shortly argue that the direct regulation of benchmark submitters is in fact necessary and 
will make recommendations to reconcile voluntary aspects of market activity such as benchmark 
submission with regulation.  
Further, this Section argues that it is ineffectual to require benchmark administrators to draw up a 
Code for submitters and oversee compliance with the Code. Oversight of benchmark submitters 
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adds cost to benchmark administration, and it would be easy to rely on box-ticking for cosmetic 
compliance to demonstrate that administrators have discharged oversight. Moreover, what 
incentives do benchmark administrators have in taking disciplinary enforcement against benchmark 
submitters? If there is a procedural issue such as having a less-than-optimal written policy in 
management of conflicts of interest, would benchmark administrators undertake the hassle and cost 
of disciplining submitters and risk losing their voluntary participation? If there is a case of suspected 
manipulation, this would likely be dealt with at the regulator and not administrator level.  
This next Section discusses the alternative approach suggested in this article- the direct regulation of 
benchmark submission which would not undermine participation in submission activity. Further, this 
article will also propose reforms to deal with the issue of ensuring market stability if a benchmark 
becomes reputationally damaged or unstable due to insufficient support for its production and/or if 
new benchmarks arise in the market. The issue of transition from the disuse of certain benchmarks 
has only been addressed cursorily by the three regulatory frameworks discussed above.  
The Regulation of Benchmark Submission 
This article proposes that instead of viewing benchmark submission as an isolated and voluntary 
activity, regulators should look at benchmark submission as part of the wider context of financial 
intermediation activities and design an appropriate scheme of regulatory governance based on a 
wider notion of  ‘benchmark participation’. ‘Benchmark participation’ should be defined widely to 
mean any activity including the entering into of bilateral transactions that involves using a 
mechanism to determine price that is not merely based on the firm’s proprietary formulae. Hence, a 
bank or financial institution should be subject to regulatory governance based on the use of a 
market mechanism to determine price in any financial instrument or transaction entered into by the 
institution concerned, whether or not the institution participates in the setting of the market 
mechanism. This scope would include primary users who are actual benchmark submitters or 
otherwise, and all would be regarded as being involved in ‘benchmark participation’. Such a scope is 
necessary so as to capture a drifting net of submitters and to put an end to the potential cat-and-
mouse game of benchmark defection by voluntarily participating primary users looking to evade 
regulation. It would render benchmark defection for the purpose of evading regulation redundant. 
Such a scope ensures that the majority of primary users, which are banks and financial institutions, 
are captured within the scheme of governance.  
This article argues that benchmark participating activity should be governed by a set of principles 
that falls within the firms’ existing regulatory obligations in internal control and treating customers 
fairly.69 In other words, the fundamental rubric of prudential and conduct regulation for the financial 
sector would also encompass benchmark participation, making this activity subject to the same 
broad regime of existing regulation. This article believes that such a framework achieves more 
coherence and comprehensiveness in regulating regulable benchmarks. First, it is proposed that 
banks and financial institutions should ensure that benchmark-related activity is subject to internal 
control, hence falling in line with existing prudential regulation. Second, banks and financial 
institutions should also be subject to regulatory principles of ensuring customer fairness where 
benchmark participation activity is concerned, consistent with existing conduct regulation. 
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Supervisory scrutiny is essential for ensuring that the regulatory principles are implemented 
effectively. 70 
In relation to the first aspect, this article suggests that benchmark participaters should ensure that 
the use and adoption of any benchmark is part of rigorous internal control.71 This means that a 
regulatory duty should be imposed on firms in that regard, and benchmark participaters should be 
satisfied about the integrity, credibility and adequate continuity of the benchmark, in order to 
protect transactional integrity of the firm’s exposures, and hence protect the firm from financial 
risks. At the very least, the firms’ internal control functions should be empowered to critically 
scrutinise benchmarks adopted in transactions. Where the firm is also a participater in terms of 
submission activities, ie contributing data or quotes or other information to assist in setting the 
benchmark, then the firm must ensure that submission activities are carried out within a robust 
internal control framework and culture to protect the firm and to undermine risks to counterparties. 
If insufficient internal control is applied to benchmark submission activities, such a firm may be 
regarded as falling short of adequate internal control obligations and may attract prudential-type 
sanctions such as capital charges.72  
Further, the obligation imposed on firms to ensure that their benchmark participation is subject to 
adequate internal control may also be regarded as having an effect upon how the firm treats 
customers. If the firm fails to exercise due internal control in its benchmark participation activities, 
including submission activities, such failure could be regarded as falling short of the ‘treating 
customers fairly’ principle, as the use of such benchmarks in retail transactions could be prejudicial 
to customers’ interests. The ‘treating customers fairly’ principle, although worded widely, has been 
held to be capable of giving rise to discrete enforcement actions by regulators and is regarded as the 
‘fundamental regulatory obligation’ upon which more precise rules may be based.73 Its lack of 
specific prescription has not prevented courts from enforcing protection intended in this principle 
for aggrieved customers of financial institutions.74  
It is argued that such a regulatory design incorporates benchmark use and submission into the 
existing regulatory framework for supervising banks’ and financial institutions’ internal control and 
customer-facing responsibilities, thus extending the regulatory scheme in a cost-effective and 
justifiable manner while not being held hostage to a drifting net of voluntary benchmark submitters. 
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It is also argued that regulatory focus should be placed at the benchmark participation/submission 
level as it is the primary level activities carried out by banks and financial institutions that have given 
rise to concerns in the recent LIBOR, foreign exchange fixing and gold-fixing scandals. It does not 
seem appropriate that the three regulatory schemes discussed earlier preponderantly focus on the 
benchmark administrators and expect for-profit administrators to oversee benchmark submitters 
effectively. Further, the proposed regulatory design is likely to dis-incentivise benchmark defection 
for the purposes of merely evading a benchmark subject to regulation, a problem that the current 
regulatory regimes have not satisfactorily addressed. The subjection of all financial institution 
benchmark users to the same governance framework ensures that there is less disparity in cost 
implications for submitters and users in the wholesale market. Moreover, primary users would 
indeed prefer and possibly take the initiative to foster benchmark credibility and continuity as part 
of good risk management and internal control. The proposed regulatory design may more effectively 
harness incentives on the part of the wholesale market to maintain the continuity of established 
benchmarks, and this benefits secondary user stakeholders.  
The proposed regulatory design above also addresses the issues fleshed out earlier concerning 
excessive cost imposed on administrators which would only entail the adoption of revenue-
generating methods that undermine secondary user stakeholders. The direct regulatory governance 
extended over benchmark participation activities is proportionate and falls within the remit of the 
UK regulator. It is arguably cost-effective for the regulator and for administrators who should focus 
on their area of expertise in collating and aggregating data in order to produce the benchmark. In 
sum, regulatory governance would be strengthened directly vis a vis banks and financial institutions 
in terms of their benchmark participation activities. Secondary users’ interest in the credibility of a 
widely-used benchmark would be secured by leveraging upon the existing enforcement regimes for 
prudential and conduct regulation, as well as the new criminal sanctions for benchmark 
manipulation. 
The Role of Regulatory Governance in Benchmark Crises 
Finally, this article suggests that regulatory governance could play a dominant role where there is a 
benchmark crisis. The three current regimes all allude to the possibility of benchmark crises but 
provide rather minimal guidance on the management of the attrition and transition of benchmarks. 
This Section argues that there is a need to introduce regulatory governance to address this issue. 
This is because a benchmark crisis that has an adverse impact on market stability could best be 
addressed by regulatory intervention and not market-based mechanisms. Market-based 
mechanisms are likely to succumb to collective action problems and are unlikely to achieve a 
coordinated response that would be needed to address adversities in market confidence.75 
The UK FCA Handbook requires that benchmark administrators take into account of the need to 
maintain ‘continuity of the specified benchmark including the need for contractual certainty for 
contracts which reference the specified benchmark’76 as part of their administration responsibilities. 
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Without specific guidance, is this a mandate to entrench a benchmark? Or to come to arrangements 
with submitters so that participation is not truncated abruptly? Or is this a mandate to take 
leadership in designing standard transition clauses in contracts so that benchmark problems would 
not affect ultimate price determination? The UK regime is not thoroughly clear on what 
administrators are expected to achieve in respect of benchmark continuity. The OICU-IOSCO 
guidelines are more prescriptive but place the responsibility on administrators to have written 
policies in place relating to transition, and to exhort users to prepare for benchmark transitions.77 
The European guidelines try to avoid benchmark discontinuity by recommending that administrators 
encourage submitters not to withdraw and that their publicly disclosed methodologies must 
incorporate considerations for operational continuity.78 The proposed European legislation 
continues along similar lines by mandating ESMA to review critical benchmarks every 4 years and by 
providing for national regulators the power to force mandatory benchmark submissions during 
benchmark transitions.79 The issue of benchmark attrition, transition and emergence of new 
benchmarks is part of parcel of market-based forces and market innovation, and regulators should 
be cautious as to unintended consequences that arise from regulatory interventions.  
The existing frameworks do not satisfactorily address the need to mitigate disruptive impact if 
benchmarks have to be replaced. Although the current regimes make administrators responsible for 
the continuity of benchmarks as far as is possible, there is little guidance on either the ex ante 
actions administrators should take, or the ex post measures administrators should have in place 
should a regulated benchmark indeed becomes unstable. Further, imposing a duty on administrators 
to ensure benchmark continuity does not provide the right incentives for administrators to develop a 
satisfactory solution. It would be futile for regulators to carry out enforcement action against 
administrators if a market crisis of confidence indeed occurs.  This article also argues that imposing a 
duty on administrators to ensure benchmark continuity would entrench existing benchmarks and 
entail neglect for the need to encourage innovation in the market for effective benchmark 
production. Finally, this article is of the view that in a crisis of confidence regarding a widely-used 
benchmark, market stability is at stake and the responsibility for managing the situation of a 
damaged benchmark or a benchmark in transition should not and cannot merely lie with benchmark 
administrators which are for-profit private sector bodies. Administrators’ expertise should lie in the 
robust collation and aggregation of data to produce a benchmark, and such expertise does not 
necessarily lend itself to the existence of a governance expertise or capacity. Just as this article is of 
the view that it is costly to delegate oversight of benchmark submitters to administrators, it is even 
more remote and implausible to ask administrators to put in place governance structures to protect 
secondary user interests in the continuity of benchmarks.  
Further, the attempt to prevent benchmark attrition by compelling benchmark submission, such as 
envisaged under the European framework, may be futile and market-distorting. Such a framework 
fails to see the prospects of benchmark innovation and merely encourages steps to preserve the 
status quo where market confidence has tumbled.  
                                                          
77
 Principle 13. 
78
 Paras B.2 and B.5. 
79
 Other transitional policies may be further developed by ESMA in Commission delegated legislation. 
This article argues that the issue of maintenance of market stability where a benchmark crisis has 
occurred should prima facie be one of regulatory interest which for-profit administrators may not be 
best placed to govern. Overseeing benchmark attrition and transition is arguably a form of crisis 
management which regulators are best placed to do in securing the public interest of market 
stability. Hence, this Section argues that regulatory governance should more clearly be extended to 
manage episodes of benchmark instability or transition. 
It is therefore suggested that regulators should be prepared to take over the temporary 
administration of a benchmark if a major benchmark becomes impeached or damaged, in order to 
regulate transitional matters for myriad transactions. This provides confidence and certainty for 
transactions, protects secondary user stakeholders and allows regulators to exercise necessary 
powers to achieve the wider interest of market stability. However this power should be applied 
sparingly, such as where a regulable benchmark becomes impaired and where widespread 
implications in the market have resulted. This suggestion is unlikely out of line with the trend of 
developing regulator-managed paradigms for financial crisis management and resolution of financial 
institutions, as has come into place in the US,80 Europe81 and UK.82  
Besides crisis-management powers for regulators, this article also proposes that regulators should 
put in place guidelines for orderly benchmark transition if it occurs. Such a framework can be based 
on protecting customers and secondary users. As benchmark transition will affect transactions at a 
bilateral level, regulators should not assume over-riding powers to rewrite contracts. Regulators 
should ensure that banks and financial institutions put in place policies for benchmark transition in a 
way that adheres to the ‘treating customers fairly’ framework, so that transitions should not be 
initiated arbitrarily, and there should be commercial certainty and fairness in transition measures. 
Failures by firms in ensuring fairness and certainty in benchmark transition could be subject to 
regulatory enforcement. Such regulatory enforcement would achieve concrete outcomes for user 
protection. This approach is preferable to imposing duties on administrators to oversee benchmark 
crises and transitions, as any enforcement against administrators would likely be in respect of 
procedural matters and achieve not much at all for real grievances of contracting parties.    
It may be argued that ‘nationalising’ a benchmark is futile if the benchmark is systemically important 
beyond a domestic market, such as for the EU as a whole, and it would be inappropriate for any 
national regulator to administer it. The article suggests that where the EU is concerned, ESMA may 
be able to temporarily administer such an impaired benchmark due to systemic implications in 
Europe as it is a body that is building up administrative capacity in direct regulation and governance.  
Further, ESMA’s regulatory objectives in prudential systemic risk oversight and consumer protection 
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in the EU would be able to support such a role of benchmark crisis management.83 However, what if 
the benchmark concerned originates from a third country outside of Europe? In such a situation, 
regulatory administration of a benchmark would need cooperation from other major jurisdictions. 
This article does not think that such obstacles may be simply overcome, but this difficulty is not a 
novel challenge given that all cross-border financial supervision suffers from the same challenge. As 
international coordination develops in areas such as prudential supervision, resolution frameworks 
and shadow banking governance, coordinating benchmark administration in a crisis should not be 
viewed as an insurmountable extension. 
D. Regulatory Capitalism, Appropriate Regulatory Design and Conclusion 
Regulating financial benchmarks is not to be assumed as a given or an unquestionable good and this 
article has adopted the position of advocating for a balance between regulatory governance and 
market-based governance for financial benchmarks that are determined to be ‘regulable’ due to 
their wide circulation, impact on stakeholder users and the market, and governance deficits in 
relation to their impact. Financial benchmarks are market innovations that overcome transaction-
costs for many, but being market innovations, they are subject to the forces of capitalism. They 
evolve to meet supply and demand needs and are subject to competitive forces generating 
innovations and alternatives. As transactional management or micro-ordering is neither appropriate 
nor ideal for regulators, the role of financial benchmarks arguably has to be in part determined and 
shaped by market forces. However, regulation steps in where capitalism ‘is out of control’84 such as 
where negative externalities are generated, or where tragedies of the commons occur.  Braithwaite 
explains the role of modern regulation as ‘steering the flow of events as opposed to providing and 
distributing’85  hence having less of an ordering and top-down character but having a new ideological 
and technological character86 of providing governance in a non-exclusive governance landscape.87 
Levi-Faur is of the view that regulation is a necessary complement to markets, and that ‘[t]he state is 
embedded in the economic and social order; any change in the state is expected to be reflected in 
the economy and the society, and vice versa.’88 Hence in this age of regulatory capitalism, ‘[t]he new 
regulatory order is social, political, and economic. State, markets, and society are not distinct entities. 
                                                          
83
 Article 8, Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24  November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending 
Decision No  716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC. 
84
 John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) at 40.  
85
 Above at 1. 
86
David Levi-Faur, ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’ (2005) 598 ANNALS of the Academy of 
Political Science 12, at 21. 
87
 The idea of a decentred landscape in financial regulation and governance, see Mads Andenas and IRIS h-y 
Chiu, The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation (Oxford; Routledge, 2014) at chapter 3. 
88
 David Levi-Faur, ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’ (2005) 598 ANNALS of the Academy of 
Political Science 12 at 14. 
Indeed, regulatory capitalism rests on an understanding of the relations between state and market 
along a condominium (Underhill 2003)’.89  
Regulatory capitalism provides a lens to understand the necessary but proportionate role of 
regulation in providing a governance framework for regulable benchmarks. This also means that 
regulatory governance should not over-reach but indeed co-exist with optimal aspects of market-
based governance in order to support the social utility of financial benchmarks as transaction-cost 
reduction devices that facilitate access to finance and at the same time meet the public interest 
needs of market confidence and stability.  
The article examines in a comparative fashion the three existing approaches in the UK, Europe and 
internationally (OICU-IOSCO), and observes that all three approaches, which share similar major 
features, achieve a mix between regulatory and market-based governance. This article supports the 
role of regulatory governance in enforcement against manipulative behaviour in relation to 
benchmarks, as all three approaches endorse. However, this article argues that the three 
approaches do not achieve an optimal balance between regulatory and market-based governance in 
relation to regulating benchmark administrators and benchmark submitters. This article has argued 
as to why the current regulatory regimes for administrators may be excessive and entail undesirable 
effects for secondary users of regulable benchmarks; and also why the current regulatory regimes 
need to be enhanced vis a vis submitters to meet regulatory objectives. Further, there is little 
agreement or convergence between the three approaches in terms of an optimal way to manage 
benchmark crises. 
This article advocates alternative approaches that are rooted in a user-centric perspective of the 
nature of financial benchmarks.  It is argued that the governance frameworks for regulable 
benchmarks should be based on protecting secondary user stakeholder interests in transaction-cost 
reduction and access to finance, and in so doing also meet the needs of maintaining market 
confidence and stability. This article recommends a reflexive approach to governing benchmark 
administration, supported by direct regulation of ‘benchmark participation’ which is widely defined 
in this article. It is envisaged that such an approach would avoid entrenching existing benchmarks 
but incentivise financial institutions to protect the integrity of benchmarks they use and generate. 
Such an approach would also avoid making regulable benchmarks less accessible and more 
expensive, prejudicing the very stakeholders that regulation intends to protect.  Further this article 
advocates that direct regulatory muscle should be used to punish anti-social behaviour in 
benchmark manipulation and in situations of crisis where market stability is at stake, such as the 
temporary administration of an unstable benchmark and governing how benchmark transition 
should take place. In sum, this article has proposed an alternative governance framework which is 
believed to be more stakeholder-centric, more closely aligned with regulatory rationale and achieves 
the ‘steering’ of the benchmark market for continuous production of privately and socially useful 
financial benchmarks. 
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